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THE FINITE MATROID-BASED VALUATION
CONJECTURE IS FALSE
NGOC MAI TRAN
Abstract. The matroid-based valuation conjecture of Ostrovsky
and Paes Leme [OPL15] states that all gross substitutes valua-
tions on n items can be produced from merging and endowments
of weighted ranks of matroids defined on at most m(n) items. We
show that if m(n) = n, then this statement holds for n ≤ 3 and
fails for all n ≥ 4. In particular, the set of gross substitutes val-
uations on n ≥ 4 items is strictly larger than the set of matroid
based valuations defined on the ground set [n]. Our proof uses
tropical geometry, matroid theory and discrete convex analysis to
explicitly construct a large family of counter-examples. It indicates
that merging and endowment by themselves are poor operations
to generate gross substitutes valuations. We also connect the gen-
eral MBV conjecture and related questions to long-standing open
problems in matroid theory, and conclude with open questions at
the intersection of this field and economics.
1. Introduction
Gross substitutes valuations form an algorithmically tractable sub-
class of submodular functions on 2[n] to R. They are of special interest
to combinatorial auctions [KJC82, GS99, DKM01, AM02, RvGP02,
BLM04, HM05, LLN06], have numerous applications and have been
discovered and rediscovered in various contexts: matroid theory and
optimization [Edm70, DW90], algebraic geometry [GGMS87, Kap93,
KT06, Spe08, BZ17], and discrete convex analysis [MS99, Mur03],
see [Lem17] for a comprehensive recent survey. Kelso and Crawford
[KJC82] put forward the notion of gross substitutes as a way to gener-
alize the theory of pricing and ascending auctions that had been devel-
oped earlier for matching markets. When agents valuations are gross
substitutes, competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [BM97] and
the competitive prices can be found by a greedy algorithm [GS99].
From the agents’ viewpoint, however, specifying an arbitrary gross
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2 NGOC MAI TRAN
substitutes function on [n] requires at least 2n/poly(n) values [Haj08,
Lem17]. This presents a major practical difficulty in implementing
combinatorial auctions with gross substitutes.
A number of papers have been devoted to finding constructive char-
acterizations for gross substitutes valuations [HM05, Haj08, KTY14,
OPL15, Lem17, Mil17, BPL18]. The general idea is to start with a
class of known gross substitutes valuations, and close it up under oper-
ations that preserve gross substitutability. Two natural operations with
simple economics interpretations are merging and endowments. With
these operations, Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] proposed to start with
unit demand valuations and called the resulting class endowed assign-
ment valuations (EAVs). They showed that this family encompasses
a large number of gross substitutes valuations frequently used in eco-
nomics. Ostrovsky and Paes Leme proved that not all gross substitutes
valuations are EAVs [OPL15]. They proposed to start with a richer
class: weighted ranks of all matroids on a finite set [m]. The resulting
class, matroid-based valuations (MBVs), is conjectured to be equal to
the set of gross substitutes.
To make this conjecture precise, one needs to clarify the relation
between m, the number of items that the matroids in the generating
set are defined on, and n, the number of items in the target class of gross
substitutes valuations. LetMBVm denote the set of all matroid-based
valuations generated from weighted ranks of all matroids on all subsets
of [m], and GSVn denote the set of all gross substitutes valuations on
all subsets of [n]. The MBV conjecture reads as follows. 1
Conjecture 1 (The Matroid-based Valuation Conjecture [OPL15]).
For each n ≥ 1, for all v ∈ GSVn, there exists some intger m(n) such
that v ∈MBVm(n). In other words, GSVn ⊆MBVm(n).
The larger m(n) is relative to n, the more complex the starting class
of weighted ranks one must start with, and thus the less attractive it is
to represent gross substitutes valuations as matroid based valuations.
Therefore, it is important to establish lower bounds for m(n). By
definition, MBVm ( GSVn for m < n and MBVm contains many
functions outside of GSVn for all m > n. Therefore, the case m = n is
1We note that a literal translation of the statement of Otrovsky and Leme allows
m to depends on v instead of n, that is, v ∈ MBVm(v). The only case where this
distinction matter is when supv∈GSVn m(v) = ∞, that is, m(n) = ∞. In other
words, to represent all gross substitutes valuations on n items, one would need to
start with all weighted ranks of all possible matroids. Even if such a result was
true, it would not be a helpful characterization of gross substitutes. Therefore, we
exclude this case in the formulation of Conjecture 1.
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particularly interesting, for it is the only case where one could have to
achieve equality between the sets MBVm and GSVn. Our main result
completely characterizes the relationship between MBVn and GSVn
for all n.
Theorem 2. For n ≤ 3,MBVn = GSVn. For n ≥ 4,MBVn ( GSVn.
The proof uses tools from tropical geometry, matroid theory and dis-
crete convex analysis to characterize gross substitutes valuations which
are irreducible. These are valuations in GSVn which cannot be written
as the merge of any other functions in GSVn, except for the trivial
merge of themselves with the all-zero function. Characterizing them
is the underlying goal of the MBV conjecture, since closing them up
under merging and endowment would give the generative description
of GSVn starting with valuations defined on subsets of [n] only. For
n ≤ 3, we enumerate all possible gross substitutes valuations by their
geometric type, and show that all irreducible valuations are weighted
ranks of the uniform matroids on [n]. For n ≥ 4, we introduce a new
family called clique valuations, and show that they are irreducible but
not in MBVn.
Our second main result characterizes the set of irreducibles amongst
matroid-based valuations. It shows that merging is strongly tied to
matroid union.
Theorem 3. A weighted rank valuation on [n] is irreducible with re-
spect to merging if and only if the corresponding matroid is irreducible
with respect to union.
Characterizing irreducible matroid is a long-standing open problem
posed by Welsh [Oxl06, Problem 11.3.9]. General solutions are known
only for binary matroids [LR73, Cun79, Daw85, Rec89]. Even if one
accepts matroid irreducibility as a blackbox criterion, Theorem 2 says
that their weighted ranks do not exhaust the set of all irreducibles.
One may ask whether their union together with the clique valuations
could generate GSVn. Again we show that the answer is no.
Theorem 4. For n ≥ 6, there exists irreducible gross substitutes val-
uations in GSVn that cannot be obtained from repeated merging and
endowment of weighted ranks of matroids and clique valuations.
Intuitively, merging tend to produce ’smoother’ functions with larger
regions of lineality (cf. Lemma 13). This means any gross substitutes
valuation with small regions of lineality tend to be irreducible. Fur-
thermore, merging is not a local operation, so small local changes in
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irreducibles create more irreducibles (cf. Proposition 26). Our counter-
example constructions for Theorems 2 and 4 are based on these obser-
vations. They indicate that merging is not a rich enough operations to
generate gross substitutes valuations from a small subclass.
The endowment operation allows one to merge functions defined on
2m parameters before restricting down to a subset of 2n values. Endow-
ment certainly enriches the class: the EAVs of Hatfield and Milgrom
[HM05] is the enlargement of the OXS clas of Lehmann, Lehmann and
Nisan [LLN06] via endowment [OPL15]. However, for large n there are
many irreducibles as constructed in the proofs of Theorem 2 and 4.
Therefore, one would expect that m has to be rather larger than n
before all irreducibles in GSVn which are not weighted matroid ranks
can be represented as endowments of weighted matroid ranks upstairs.
In other words, it is unlikely that the MBV conjecture would hold,
and even if it does, m(n) may be very large. Going forward with con-
structive descriptions of gross substitutes, one may want to supplement
merging and endowment with other operations such as matroid rank
sums [ST15] or tree-concordant sum [BPL18].
Organization. Section 2 reviews the economics formulation and set
notations. Section 3 gives a geometric interpretation of the merging
and endowment operations through the language of tropical geometry,
and uses them to prove Theorem 2 for n ≤ 3. Section 4 connects
irreducible valuations under merging to irreducible matroids and proves
Theorem 3. Section 5 introduces clique valuations and prove that they
are not inMBVn, establishing Theorem 2. Section 6 proves Theorem 4.
We conclude with a brief summary in Section 7.
Notations. For a set Q ⊂ Rn, conv(Q) denote its convex hull. For an
integer n, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The indicator vector of a subset S ⊂ [n]
is χS ∈ {0, 1}n, defined by (χS)i = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ S. Definition of matroid
terminologies can be found in [Oxl06].
2. The economics formulation
Consider an economy with n indivisible objects. A function u :
2[n] → R is said to be a valuation if u(∅) = 0 and u(S) ≤ u(T ) if
S ⊆ T . By identifying S ⊆ [n] with its indicator χS, we shall also view
u as a function u : {0, 1}n → R. An agent with valuation u has indirect
utility function fu : Rn → R, which takes a price vector p ∈ Rn, and
maps it to the best profit that she can make under this price. That is,
(1) fu(p) = max
a∈{0,1}n
(u(a)− 〈p, a〉).
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For each p ∈ Rn, the set of a ∈ {0, 1}n that achieves the maximum in
(1) is the demand set of the agent at price p, denoted Du(p).
Definition 5 (Gross substitutes [KJC82]). A valuation u on [n] has
the gross substitutes property if: for any pair of price vectors p and
p′ such that p′i ≥ pi for all i ∈ [n], for any X ∈ Du(p), there exists
X ′ ∈ Du(p′) such that: if j ∈ X and pj = p′j, then j ∈ X ′.
Let GSVn be the set of all gross substitutes valuations defined on all
possible subsets of [n]. For T ⊆ [n], the endowment of u to T is the
valuation u(·|T ) on [n]− T , given by
u(S|T ) = u(S + T )− u(T ) for all S ⊆ [n]− T.
For subsets S, T ⊆ [n], the merge of valuations u : 2S → R≥0 and
v : 2T → R≥0 is the valuation u ∗ v defined on S ∪ T , with
u ∗ v(X) := max
Y⊆X
(u(Y ) + v(X − Y )) for all X ⊆ S ∪ T.
In economics terms, u ∗ v is the valuation of a company formed by
the merge of two agents with valuations u and v, respectively. The
endowment to T is the valuation of an agent who started with T , so
it measures how much another subset of items S adds to what she
already had. In the discrete convexity literature, merging is called
convolution and endowment is marginal valuation [Mur03, §6]. Both
of these operations preserve gross substitutability.
Lemma 6 ([Mur03], Theorem 6.15). If u, v ∈ GSVn and T ⊂ [n], then
u ∗ v ∈ GSVn, and u(·|T ) ∈ GSVn.
For S ⊆ [n], let E = (S, I) be a matroid with independence sets
I. The weighted matroid rank function ρw : 2S → R≥0 with weight
w ∈ Rn≥0 is defined by
(2) ρw(T ) = max{
∑
i∈I
wi : I ∈ I, I ⊆ T}.
When wi = 1 for all i ∈ [n], ρw is the rank function of the matroid E .
Weighted matroid rank functions are also called weighted matroid val-
uations [OPL15]. We will call them weighted rank for short.
Example 1. For S ⊆ [n], let u : 2S → R≥0 defined by
u(T ) = max
i∈T
wi
for some w ∈ Rn≥0. Then u is the weighted rank of the uniform matroid
U1,S of rank 1 on the ground set S. It is also called a unit demand
valuation, and can represented graphically as a bipartite graph with
[n] nodes on the left, labelled 1 to n, and one node A on the right,
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with wi the weight of the edge (1, A). Their merge are called XOS
[LLN06] or max bipartite matching valuations [Mur03, §2], for (u1 ∗
· · · ∗ ur)(T ) equals the max-weighted matching on subsets of T in the
graph obtained by taking the union of the graphs of u1, . . . , ur. For
concrete examples, see Figures 5 to 12.
Lemma 7 ([Mur03], equation (2.78)). Let ρw be a weighted rank of
some matroid (S, I), S ⊆ [n]. Then ρw ∈ GSVn.
Definition 8 (Matroid based valuations [OPL15]). The class of matroid-
based valuations on n, denote MBVn, is the smallest class of all valu-
ations v defined on subsets of [n] which contains all weighted matroid
rank functions defined with some weight vector, on some matroid on
subsets of [n], and is closed under merging and endowments.
The following result summarizes the relationship between MBVm
and GSVn for general m and n. In particular, it shows that Conjec-
ture 1 can hold at the finite level, that is, MBVm = GSVn, only if
m = n.
Corollary 9. For any m,n ≥ 1, MBVm ⊆ GSVn for all m < n, and
MBVm contains valuations that are not in GSVn for all m > n.
Proof. By definition, MBVn ( MBVn+1, thus it is sufficient to con-
sider the cases m = n and m = n+ 1. By Lemmas 6 and 7, MBVn ⊆
GSVn. Now, MBVn+1 contains weighted rank of matroids defined on
[n + 1], while GSVn only contains gross substitutes valuations defined
on subsets of [n]. Therefore, MBVm contains valuations outside of
GSVn. 
3. The geometry of merging
In this section, we show that under the tropical algebra, merging
corresponds to multiplication and truncation of polynomials. This al-
lows us to interpret this operation geometrically, and thereby gives a
constructive proof that GSVn = MBVn for all n ≤ 3. Tropical ge-
ometry forms a bridge between economics problems with discrete out-
comes, polyhedral geometry, matroid theory and algebraic geometry.
There is a growing literature on tropical methods auction theory and
mechanism design [BK16, CT16, LT17, TY18]. For an introduction to
tropical geometry, see [MS15].
Consider the max-plus tropical algebra (R,,⊕), where ab := a+b
and a ⊕ b := max(a, b). A tropical polynomial f : Rn → R is defined
by
f(p) =
⊕
a∈A
f [a] pa = max
a∈A
f [a] + 〈p, a〉
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for p ∈ Rn, where A ⊂ Nn is its support, and (f [a] ∈ R : a ∈ A) are
its coefficients. Say that two polynomials are equal if they equal as an
algebraic expression, that is, each of their coefficients agree. Say that
f is multiaffine if it is square-free, that is, A ⊆ {0, 1}n. The multiaffine
part of f , denoted f ↓, is the tropical polynomial
f ↓(p) =
⊕
a∈A∩{0,1}n
f [a] pa.
The regular subdivision ∆f of A induced by f is the collection of
subsets of A obtained by projection of faces of f onto A. That is,
∆f := {argmax
a∈A
[f [a] pa] | x ∈ Rn}.
The elements of ∆u are called cells of the subdivision. If
σ = argmax
a∈A
[f [a] pa,
say that σ is the cell of ∆f supported by p. The convex hull of a cell
is called a face. Note that a cell is a finite set of integer points while a
face is a polytope. Let us summarize the relevance of these polynomials
to the combinatorial auction setting.
Remark 10. A valuation u : {0, 1}n → R defines a tropical polynomial
fu with fu[a] := u[a]. The map p 7→ fu(−p) is the indirect utility
function of an agent with valuation u, defined in (1). The cell σ−p of
∆fu supported by −p is the demand set of the agent at price p.
Example 2 (GSV2 =MBV2). Figure 1 enumerates all possible regular
subdivisions of [0, 1]n induced by gross substitutes valuations defined
on two items, up to permutation of the item labels. A valuation v on
2[2] must satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(1) = w1, v(2) = w2 for some w1, w2 ≥ 0,
and v({1, 2}) = w1 + w2 − a for some 0 ≤ a ≤ min(w1, w2). When
a > 0, ∆v subdivides the square into two triangles, shown in the top of
Figure 1. This subdivision consists of 4 cells of dimension 0 (the four
vertices of the square), 5 cells of dimension 1 (pairs of vertices that
make up the five edges), and 2 cells of dimension 2 (the set of vertices
that make up the three triangles). We say that the triangles are the
full-dimensional faces of ∆v. When a = 0, ∆v does not subdivide the
square at all. It has one full-dimensional face, namely, the square itself.
This is called the trivial subdivision. In each case, v can written as the
merge of weighted matroid ranks on 2 items, as shown in Figure 1.
Therefore, GSV2 =MBV2.
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Figure 1. A short proof that GSV2 = MBV2. In the
first case, 0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ w1 + a < w1 + w2. In the
second case, 0 ≤ w1, w2. Figure accompanies Example 2.
Lemma 11. For S, T ⊆ [n], let u be a valuation on S and v be a
valuation on T . Then
fu∗v = (fu  fv)↓.
Proof. The tropical polynomial fu  fv = fu + fv has support A =
{0, 1, 2}n. For a ∈ {0, 1, 2}n,
(fu  fv)[a] =
⊕
b,b′∈{0,1}n:bb′=a
u(b) + v(b′).
In particular, for all a ∈ {0, 1}n,
(fu  fv)[a] =
⊕
b≤a
u(b) + v(a− b) = u ∗ v(a) = (fu∗v)[a].

Corollary 12. Let u, v : {0, 1}n → R be valuations. Then σp is a cell
of ∆fu∗v supported by p ∈ Rn if and only if
(3) σp = (σ
u
p + σ
v
p) ∩ {0, 1}n,
where σup is the cell of ∆fu supported by p, and σ
v
p is the cell of ∆fv
supported by p.
Proof. By a direct computation, one finds that for all p ∈ Rn, if τp ⊂
{0, 1, 2}n is a cell of ∆fufv supported by p, then
τp = σ
u
p + σ
v
p .
Lemma 11 then implies (3). 
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Equation (3) of Corollary 12 holds at the level of cells, and not at
the level of faces. That is, while
conv(σp) = conv((σ
u
p + σ
v
p) ∩ {0, 1}n),
in general,
conv(σp) 6= (conv(σup ) + conv(σvp)) ∩ [0, 1]n.
In other words, taking convex hull and taking integer points do not
generally commute, see [TY18] for a concrete example. For gross sub-
stitutes valuations, however, these two operations do commute. This
distinction is precisely the difference between a combinatorial auction
with competitive equilibrium and one without [DKM01, DK04, BK16,
TY18].
Lemma 13 ([DK04]). Let u, v ∈ GSVn. Then Fp is a face of ∆fu∗v
supported by p ∈ Rn if and only if
(4) Fp = (F
u
p + F
v
p ) ∩ [0, 1]n,
where σup is the face of ∆fu supported by p, and σ
v
p is the face of ∆fv
supported by p.
3.1. Proof of Theorem 2 for n ≤ 3. We now prove GSVn =MBVn
for all n ≤ 3. The case n = 1 is trivial. The case n = 2 is shown
in Example 2. For n = 3, we shall enumerate all possible regular
subdivisions ∆v for v ∈ GSVn, and gives an explicit decomposition
of v in each case as a merge of functions in MBVn. As it turns out,
we shall not need the endowment operation. Therefore, it is sufficient
to consider v supported on [3]. First we need a characterization of
gross substitutes valuations in terms of their regular subdivisions. This
is a consequence of two results: [Mur03, Theorem 6.30] and [Fuj05,
Theorem 17.1]. The latter is attributed to an unpublished result of
Tomizawa in 1983 [Fuj05, p. 332] and proved in [FY03]. It was also
independently discovered by Danilov, Koshevoy and Lang [DKL03] and
Gelfand, Goresky, MacPherson and Serganova [GGMS87].
Definition 14. Say that a lattice polytope P ⊆ Zn is M \ if its edges
are in {ei − ej, ei : i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j}.
Theorem 15 ([FY03]). A valuation u : {0, 1}n → R is gross substitutes
if and only if all faces of the regular subdivision ∆fv are M
\ polytopes.
Proof. By [FY03], u is gross substitutes if and only if it is an M \-
concave function on {0, 1}n. By Murota [Mur03, Theorem 6.30], this
happens if and only if all faces of the regular subdivision ∆fv are M
\
polytopes. 
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Figure 2. All possible regular subdivisions of a gross
substitutes valuation defined on 3 items, up to permu-
tations of item labels. In the top left figure, points are
labelled as vertices of the cube {0, 1}3. In the bottom
left figure, points are labelled as subsets of [3].
Proof of Theorem 2 for n = 3. Let v ∈ GSV3. By permuting the in-
dices, without loss of generality, we can assume that v({3}) ≤ v({2}) ≤
v({1}). By Theorem 15, the edges of the faces of ∆v must be parallel to
one of the edges in {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1,−1, 0), (1, 0,−1), (0, 1,−1)}.
Figure 2 shows all possible regular subdivisions of [0, 1]3 that satify
this condition. For each fixed regular subdivision with w1 := v({1}),
w2 := v({2}), w3 := v({3}), Figures 5 to 12 show a parametrization of
v at other vertices of the cube on the left. The captions give the con-
ditions that the parameters must satisfy so that ∆v is the prescribed
subdivision. The RHS of these figures show that v is a max bipartite
matching, in other words, it is a merge of unit demand valuations (cf.
Example 1). Therefore, v ∈MBV3, as required. 
Corollary 16. For n ≤ 3, any gross substitutes valuation v ∈ GSVn
can be written as the convolution of unit-demand valuations. That
is, for n ≤ 3, the classes gross substitute valuations, matroid-based
valuations, endowed assignment valuations and XOS are all equal.
4. Irreducible gross substitutes valuations and
irreducible matroids
This section spells out the crucial connection between the merging
operation and taking matroid union. We use this to prove Theorem 3
which characterizes all irreducible valuations in MBVn.
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Definition 17 (M -irreducible polytopes). Let P ⊆ [0, 1]n be an M \-
convex lattice polytope. Say that P is M -reducible if there exists M \
polytope P 1, . . . , P r ⊆ [0, 1]n which are not vertices, r ≥ 2, such that
P = (
r∑
i=1
P i) ∩ [0, 1]n.
Say that P is M -irreducible if it is not M -reducible.
Definition 18 (Matroid union and irreducibility). Let S, T ⊆ [n]. For
matroids E1 = (S, I1) and E2 = (T, I2), their union E1 ∪ E2 is the
matroid defined on S ∪ T , with independent sets
I = {I1 ∪ I2 : I1 ∈ I1, I2 ∈ I2}.
Say that a matroid E is reducible if E = E1 ∪ E2 for some E1, E2 6= E .
Otherwise, say that it is irreducible.
The independence polytope of a matroid E is the convex hull of its
independence sets, that is
P = conv{χI : I ∈ I}.
The following result connects M -irreducibility, matroid union, and the
merging operation.
Proposition 19. Let E , E1, . . . , Em are matroids on subsets of [n], with
rank functions ρ, ρ1, . . . , ρm and independence polytopes P, P1, . . . , Pm,
respectively. The following are equivalent.
(1) E = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Em
(2) P = (P1 + · · ·+ Pm) ∩ [0, 1]n
(3) ρ = ρ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ρm
Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (2) is a straight-forward translation
of the definition of matroid union. That (2) is equivalent to (3) follows
from Edmond’s matroid intersection theorem [Sch03, Theorem 41.1].

Corollary 20. If P is the independence polytope of some matroid, then
P is M-irreducible if and only if the matroid is irreducible.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that E is irreducible. Without loss of
generality, assume that E is supported on [n], that is, it has no loop.
Let F be the matroid polytope of E . Since E has no loop, F is full-
dimensional. By definition of weighted matroid rank, F is a face of ∆ρw .
By Corollary 20, F is M -irreducible. Now suppose that ρw = u1 ∗ u2
for some u1, u2 ∈ GSVn. By Lemma 13,
F = (F 1 + F 2) ∩ [0, 1]n
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for some faces F i ∈ ∆ui , i = 1, 2. Since F is M -irreducible and full-
dimensional, either F 1 or F 2 must identically be equal to F , while the
other is the vertex χ∅. Without loss of generality, let F = F 1. So
F = F 1 ∈ ∆u1 . By Lemma 13,
ρw(S) = wS = u
1(S) + v1(∅) = u1(S)
for all S ∈ F ∩{0, 1}n. In particular, this equality holds for all S which
are bases of E . Now let S /∈ I. Then
u1(S) ≤ ρw(S) = max
B∈I,B⊂S
ρw(B) = max
B∈I,B⊂S
u(B) ≤ u(S).
Therefore, ρw(S) = u1(S) for all S ∈ [n], so ρw is a irreducible. For the
converse, suppose that E is reducible, so E = E1 ∪ E2, for E1 defined
on ground set E1, and E2 defined on ground set E2. Let w1 be the
restriction of w to S1, and w2 be the restriction of w to S2. It is
straight-forward to check that
ρw = ρw
1 ∗ ρw2 .
Since E1 6= E2, ρw1 6= ρw, and thus ρw is not a irreducible. 
5. Proof of Theorem 2 for n ≥ 4
In this section, we introduce the family of clique valuations. We show
by a direct computation that for n ≥ 4, they are irreducibles, and are
not in MBVn. This establishes Theorem 2 for n ≥ 4.
Definition 21. Let S = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a partition of [n], that is,
Sr ⊆ [n], Sr∩S` = ∅ for all r, ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i 6= j, and S1∪· · ·∪Sm =
[n]. For 0 < a < b < 2a, the clique valuation v = vS,a,b on [n] is given
by
v(∅) = 0
v({i}) = a for all i ∈ [n]
v(I) =
{
a if I ⊆ Sr for some r = 1, . . . ,m
b else.
In other words, we think of S as partitioning the complete graph on
[n] vertices into m cliques (complete subgraphs). Each I ⊆ [n] identifies
a subgraph, and v(I) = b if this subgraph contains an edge that goes
between two different cliques. Otherwise, v(I) = a.
Lemma 22. For n ≥ 4, for any partition S of [n] and any 0 < a <
b < 2a, v = vS,a,b ∈ GSVn.
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Figure 3. Three possible clique valuations for n = 4 up
to item relabeling. Solid edges between nodes indicate
that they belong to the same partition. From left to
right, the corresponding partitions are S = {{1, 2, 3, 4}},
S = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}} and S = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. View I ⊆
[n] as a subgraph of the complete graph, the valuation
v(I) is b if it contains a dashed edge, and a otherwise.
For example, the valuation depicted in the last graph is
v(I) = a for all I = {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, and
v(I) = b for all other I ⊆ [n], I 6= ∅.
Proof. For S ⊂ [n], i, j /∈ S, define
∂ijv(S) := v(S + i+ j) + v(S)− (v(S + i) + v(S + j)).
By [RvGP02, HM04], v ∈ GSVn if and only if
max(∂ijv(S), ∂ikv(S), ∂jkv(S)) ≤ 0,(5)
and the maximum is achieved at least twice ∀S ⊂ [n], i, j, k /∈ S.
We shall prove that v = vS,a,b satisfies this statement by an induction
argument on n. Consider the base case with n = 4. Up to permutation
of the indices, the possible partitions S of [4] are the following (see
Figure 3).
• S = {{1, 2, 3, 4}}. Then v is the weighted rank function of the
uniform matroid U1,[4] with weights w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = a.
So v ∈ GSV4.
• S = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}}. Then v = u ∗ ω, where u is the weighted
rank function of the uniform matroid U1,[3] with weights w1 =
w2 = w3 = w4 = a, and ω is the weighted rank function of the
uniform matroid U1,{4} with weight w4 = b− a. So v ∈ GSV4.
• S = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. Then i, j, k must have exactly two nodes
in one partition, and the third in the other partition. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can assume that i = 1, j = 2, k =
3. Then either S = ∅ or S = {4}. In each cases, we have
∂12v(∅) = a− (a+ a) < ∂13v(∅) = ∂23v(∅) = b− (a+ a) < 0,
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and
∂12v({4}) = a− b < ∂13v({4}) = ∂23v({4}) = 0.
Thus v satisfies (5), so v ∈ GSV4.
This proves the base case. Now suppose that the statement is true
up to some n ≥ 4. Consider the case n + 1. Let v = vS,a,b for some
partition S of [n + 1]. Fix S ⊂ [n + 1] and i, j, k ∈ [n + 1], i, j, k /∈ S.
There are three cases.
(i) |S| ≤ n − 3. Then there exists some node i′ /∈ S ∪ {i, j, k}.
Remove i′ from the graph, and let w be the induced clique
valuation on [n+ 1]− i′. Then
∂ijv(S) = ∂ijw(S), ∂ikv(S) = ∂ikw(S), ∂jkv(S) = ∂jkw(S).
By the induction hypothesis, w ∈ GSVn. Therefore, (5) is
satisfied for v at S, {i, j, k}.
(ii) |S| = n−3 and v(S) = b. Then v(S ′) = v(S) = b for all S ′ ⊇ S.
Therefore,
∂ijv(S) = ∂ikv(S) = ∂jkv(S) = 0.
So (5) holds.
(iii) |S| = n−3 and v(S) = a. Then we can contract all nodes in S,
and replace them by one node 1′. Let w be the clique valuation
on the induced graph on {1′, i, j, k}, with
∂ijv(S) = ∂ijw(1
′), ∂ikv(S) = ∂ikw(1′), ∂jkv(S) = ∂jkw(1′).
Since w ∈ GSV4 by the induction hypothesis, (5) holds for v.
Therefore, v ∈ GSVn. 
Lemma 23. Let n ≥ 4, 0 < a < b < 2a. Suppose S = {S1, . . . , Sm} is
a partition of [n] such that |Sr| ≥ 2 for each r = 1, . . . ,m. Then vS,a,b
is irreducible.
Proof. Suppose that v = u∗w for some u,w ∈ GSVn. Assume without
loss of generality that v({1}) = u({1}) = a. For any i 6= 1,
a+ b ≥ v({1, i}) ≥ u({1}) + w({i}) = a+ w({i}),
so w({i}) ≤ b− a < a. But
v({i}) = max(u({i}), w({i})) = a,
therefore u({i}) = a for all i ∈ [n]. By the assumption on S, for each
i ∈ [n], there exists some j ∈ [n] such that i and j belong to the same
partition, so
v({i, j}) = a ≥ u({j}) + w({i}) = a+ w({i}).
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So w({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Therefore, w is the all-zero function, so
v = u. Thus v is irreducible. 
Lemma 24. Let n ≥ 4, 0 < a < b < 2a. Suppose S = {S1, . . . , Sm}
is a partition of [n] such that |Sr| ≥ 2 for each r = 1, . . . ,m, and that
m ≥ 2. Then v /∈MBVn.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that v ∈ MBVn. Since it is irre-
ducible, by Theorem 3, v = ρw where ρw is the weighted rank of some
matroid E on [n]. By definition, v({i, j} ≤ a + c < v({i}) + v({j}),
E is a matroid of rank one. Since v({i}) = a = wi > 0 for all i, this
matroid is loopless. Therefore, E must be the uniform matroid U1,[n].
But by the assumption on §, there exists some i, j ∈ [n] such that
v({i, j} = b 6= max(wi, wj) = a. So v 6= ρw, a contradiction. Thus
v /∈MBVn. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We showed that for n ≤ 3, MBV3 = GSV3 in
Section 3. For n ≥ 4, for each pair of real numbers a, b ∈ R such that
0 < a < b < 2a, and for S = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, . . . , n}}, the clique valuation
vS,a,b is in GSVn by Lemma 22, but it is not in MBVn by Lemma 24.
This shows that MBVn ( GSVn. 
6. Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we construct another large family of irreducibles for
n ≥ 6 that cannot be obtained as clique valuations nor weighted ma-
troid ranks, thereby proves Theorem 4. Our strategy is to start with
the weighted rank of an irreducible matroid E , and modify it slightly to
ensure that the new valuation v is still irreducible, but its regular sub-
division ∆v contains a desired M -irreducible polytope F . By choosing
F appropriately, we can ensure that F cannot be a face of any regular
subdivision coming from weighted matroid ranks nor clique valuations.
This would prove the desired statement. The reason this proof requires
n ≥ 6 is that it starts with a loopless irreducible matroid of rank at
least two, and that the smallest such matroid is for n = 6 (cf. Lemma
27). We leave open the problem of establishing Theorem 4 holds for
n = 4 and n = 5.
Let g, f : {0, 1}n → N be integer-valued valuations, g(∅) = f(∅) = 0,
g submodular, f supermodular. A pair (g, f) defines a (possibly empty)
polytope
(6) P (g, f) = {x ∈ Rn : g(I) ≤ xI ≤ f(I) : I ⊆ [n]}.
Say that (g, f) is a crossing family if for all I, J ⊆ [n]
(7) g(I)− g(I − J) ≤ f(J)− f(J − I) for all I, J ⊆ [n].
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The next proposition is a general recipe for obtaining more irre-
ducible M -irreducible polytopes from a given independence polytope of
an irreducible matroid. It is a slight generalization of the g-polymatroid
intersection theorem [Sch03, Theorem 46.1]. The proof is given in Ap-
pendix A.
Proposition 25. Let P (0, ρ) be the matroid independence polytope of
an irreducible matroid. Let τ be any submodular function such that
(τ, ρ) is a crossing family. Then P (τ, ρ) is M-irreducible.
We now use this result to construct the desired gross substitutes
valuation. Let ρw be the weighted matroid rank of a loopless irreducible
matroid E of rank at least two. For each constant c > 0, define the
valuation vc,ρ,w
(8) vc,ρ,w(∅) = 0, vc,ρ,w(I) = ρw(I) + c for all I ⊆ [n], I 6= ∅.
Define the supermodular function g : {0, 1}n → N by g(∅) = 0, and
g(I) = 1 for all I ⊆ [n], I 6= ∅.
Proposition 26. For any w ∈ Rn>0 and any c > 0, the valuation
v = vc,ρ,w defined in (8) satisfies the following.
(i) v ∈ GSVn and v is irreducible
(ii) v cannot be obtained from repeated merging and endowment of
weighted ranks of matroids and clique valuations.
Proof. Define the valuation u on [n] by u(S) = v(S) − c for all S ⊆
[n]. Since regular subdivisions is invariant under addition by constant,
∆v = ∆u, pointwise. But u(I) = ρ
w(I) for all I ⊆ [n], except for the
emptyset, where u(∅) = −c < 0. Since the matroid E is loopless, all
the singletons belong to the matroid independence polytope P (0, ρ).
Therefore, ∆u is obtained from ∆ρw by splitting the origin χ∅ away
from P (0, ρ), creating two faces (see Figure 4). A short computation
shows that these two faces are
P0 = conv{χ∅, χi : i ∈ [n]}
and its complement,
P (g, ρ) = conv{I ∈ P (0, ρ), I 6= ∅}.
Compared to ∆ρw , ∆u has extra edges of the form χ{i} − χ{j}. Since
ρw ∈ GSVn, by Theorem 15, u ∈ GSVn. Note that P (g, ρ) is a face of
∆v. It is straight-forward to check that (g, ρ) is a crossing family. By
Proposition 25, P (g, ρ) is M -irreducible. Since the matroid E is loopless
and has rank at least two, P (g, ρ) contains {χ{i} : i ∈ [n]}, and at least
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one more point in [0, 1]n with sum at least two. Therefore, it is full-
dimensional. Now, suppose that v = ω∗τ for some ω, τ ∈ GSVn. Since
P (g, ρ) is a full-dimensional M -irreducible face of ∆v, P (g, ρ) must be
a face of either ∆ω or ∆τ . Suppose without loss of generality that it is
a face of ∆ω. This means
v(I) = ω(I) for all χI ∈ P (g, ρ).
Clearly v(∅) = ω(∅), so v(I) = ω(I) for all χI ∈ P (0, ρ). Now let
S ⊆ [n]. Then
ω(S) ≤ v(S) = max{v(I) : I ⊆ S, χI ∈ P (0, ρ)}
= max{ω(I) : I ⊆ S, χI ∈ P (0, ρ)}
=≤ ω(S).
So ω(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ [n]. Thus v is irreducible. For the second
claim, since v is irreducible and full-dimensional, it is sufficient to show
that v is not the weighted rank of some irreducible matroid E ′, or some
clique valuation. In the first case, suppose for contradiction that v is
the weighted rank of some matroid E ′. Then the largest cell of ∆v that
contains the origin must equal to the independence polytope of E ′. But
this cell this the simplex P0, therefore, E
′ is the uniform matroid of
rank 1 on n. But for I = {i, j} an independent set in E with rank 2,
this implies
v({i, j}) = max(wi + c, wjc)
By definition of v in (8), we have
v({i, j}) = wi + wj + c.
Since w ∈ Rn>0, these two quantities cannot be equal, a contradiction.
Therefore, v is not a weighted matroid rank. In the second case, sup-
pose for contradiction that it is the clique valuation parametrized by
(S, a, b). Then one would necessarily have vi = a for all i, but this is
false. So v is not a clique valuation. 
Proof of Theorem 4. For n = 6, the graphical matroid on the complete
graph on four vertices M(K4) is a loopless, irreducible binary matroid
of rank 3 [Oxl06, p428]. Lova´sz and Recski [LR73] showed that binary
matroids are irreducible if and only if they are connected and their
one-element deletions are also connected. These properties and being
loopless are preserved under parallel extensions, therefore, there is at
least one loopless irreducible matroid for each n ≥ 6. For each n, let E
be such a matroid. For each weighted rank ρw of E , construct v as (8).
Proposition 26 applied to v implies Theorem 4. 
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Figure 4. Proof idea of Theorem 4. Figure not to scale
and is for illustration purpose only. The LHS depicts
the regular subdivision ∆ρw for the weighted rank of an
irreducible matroid, where the origin (bottom left) is con-
tained in a certain face. The valuation v in (8) is con-
structed from ρw such that its regular subdivision ∆v
splits the origin away from this face while leaving the
other faces of the regular subdivision the same. This
creates two new faces: the standard simplex on [n], and
the complement P (g, ρ). Since the matroid is irreducible,
P (g, ρ) is M -irreducible, and this face witnesses the irre-
ducibility of v in GSVn.
We remark that the construction in the proof of Theorem 2 does not
apply for n ≤ 5 since there are no loopless irreducible matroids on at
most 5 elements of rank at least two.
Lemma 27. Let n ≤ 5 and E be an irreducible matroid without loop
on [n]. Then E is the uniform matroid on [n] of rank 1.
Proof. Let Ur,S denote the uniform matroid of rank r on the ground set
S. It is clear that U1,[n] is irreducible. Now suppose that E is another
irreducible matroid. Then E must be connected, and its one-element
deletions must also be connected [Rec89]. Exhaustive enumeration
using the database of matroid [MMIB12, MMIB19] and the software
Sage [TheYY] shows that the only matroids E on n ≤ 5 elements that
satisfies these properties are U2,[4], U2,[5], U[3],5, and the matroid E2 of
rank 2 on 5 elements, obtained by taking U2,[5] and excluding {1, 2}
from its set of bases. By direct computations,
U2,[4] = U1,[4] ∪ U1,[3], U2,[5] = U1,[5] ∪ U1,[4],
U3,[5] = U2,[5] ∪ U1,[4], E2 = U1,[5] ∪ U1,{3,4,5}.
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Therefore, none of these matroids are irreducible. 
7. Summary and Open Questions
The matroid-based valuation (MBV) conjecture states that all gross
substitutes valuations on at most n items can be generated from repeat-
edly merging and taking the endowments of weighted rank of matroids
defined on subsets of at most m items. For finite n, equality can be
achieved between these two classes if and only if m = n. In this paper
we proved that this finite version of the MBV conjecture holds when
the number of items n is at most 3, and fails for all n ≥ 4. Our proof
is constructive: for small n it gives an explicit decomposition based
on the geometry of gross substitute valuations, for large n it gives a
large family of gross substitutes valuations that cannot be obtained
through merging and endowments of weighted ranks. We also showed
that some matroid-based valuations themselves are also the merge of
other matroid-based valuations, and went on to characterize all the ex-
treme elements in this class. These are precisely the weighted ranks of
irreducible matroids.
Our paper leaves three interesting open questions at the intersec-
tion of economics and matroid theory. First, our results indicate that
merging and endowment alone are not rich enough operations to gen-
erate all gross substitutes valuations from a small subclass. Hatfield
and Milgrom [HM05] showed that a large number of gross substitutes
valuations that arise in economic applications are endowed assignment
valuations (EAV), a much smaller class of functions obtained by merg-
ing and endowments of unit demand valuations. It would be interesting
to systematically generalize this class even further, not with the goal
of generating all gross substitutes valuations, but to generate a larger
and useful subclass with tractable representations. For example, the
clique valuations contain unit demand valuations with constant weights
as a special case. Could they be generalized to a weighted version so
that they subsume the EAV class? What would be their economics
interpretations?
The second open direction is: what are the class of all irreducible
gross substitutes valuations on [n]? Our results show that character-
izing this class is fundamentally tied to the long-standing question of
Welsh on characterizing irreducible matroids. We remark that endow-
ment generalizes matroid contraction. However, it is not immediately
obvious that the endowment of a weighted rank of some matroid E
is the weighted rank of the contraction of E . Is this true in general?
If not, what are the gross substitutes valuations which are irreducible
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under merging but can be obtained as the contraction of the weighted
rank of an irreducible matroid upstairs? These questions are funda-
mental to tackling the general MBV conjecture, and we hope that they
will fuel new developments at the intersection of theoretical economics
and matroid theory.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 25
Lemma 28 ([Mur03],(4.37)). The pair (g, f) is a crossing family if
and only if P (g, f) is an M \ polytope. Furthermore, in this case, the
inequalities are tight, that is,
f(I) = max{xI : x ∈ P (g, f)},
g(I) = min{xI : x ∈ P (g, f)}.
Lemma 29. An integer-valued valuation f : {0, 1}n → N is the rank
function of some matroid E if and only if f(I) ≤ |I| for all I ⊆ [n]. In
this case, P (0, f) is the indepndence polytope of E.
Proof. This follows from the equivalence between the independence ax-
ioms and the rank axioms for matroids. 
Lemma 30 ([Edm70], [Mur03] p115–117). If P (gi, f i) are M \ lattice
polytopes for i = 1, . . . , r, then their Minkowski sum is an M \ lattice
polytope, with
r∑
i=1
P (gi, f i) = P (
r∑
i=1
gi,
r∑
i=1
f i).
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Proof of Proposition 25. By Lemma 28, P (g, ρ) is a non-empty M \
polytope. Suppose for contradiction that it is not M -irreducible, that
is,
P (g, ρ) = (
r∑
i=1
P i) ∩ [0, 1]n
where P i are M \ polytopes which are not vertices, r ≥ 2. By Lemma
28, for each i = 1, . . . , r, P i = P (gi, ρi) for some crossing families
(gi, ρi), and ρi the rank function of some matroids E i. Let
f =
r∑
i=1
ρi, g =
r∑
i=1
gi.
Note that by Lemma 30,
∑r
i=1 P
i = P (g, f), so in particular, (g, f) is
a crossing family. We claim that
(9) ρ(T ) = min
J⊆T
(f(J) + |T − J |) for each T ⊆ [n].
This follows from linear programming duality of a certain totally dual
integral system. More specifically, for a weight vector w ∈ Rn≥0, con-
sider the following integer program:
max 〈w, x〉 s.t. x ∈ P (g, ρ).
Since P (g, ρ) = P (g, f)∩ [0, 1]n, this is an integer program of the form
max 〈w, x〉
s.t. g(I) ≤ 〈x, eI〉 ≤ f(I) for all I ⊆ [n]
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, xi ∈ Z for all i ∈ [n]
Its dual is the following program in decision variables (zi, y
+
I , y
−
I : i ∈
[n], I ⊆ [n], I 6= ∅)
min
n∑
i=1
zi +
∑
I⊆[n],I 6=∅
y+I f(I)− y−I g(I)(10)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
zi · e{i} +
∑
I⊆[n],I 6=∅
(y+I − y−I )eI = w(11)
zi, y
+
I , y
−
I ∈ R≥0.(12)
Write F : (z, y) 7→ F (z, y) for the objective function of the dual. For a
fixed T ⊆ [n], plug in w = χT . Then the value of the primal program
is
max{xT : x ∈ P (g, ρ)} = ρ(T )
by Lemma 28. Now consider the dual program. We claim that we can
choose an optimal solution where y−I = 0 for all I ⊆ [n]. Indeed, let
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(z, y) be a feasible integral vector. Suppose that y−I > 0 for some I.
By the constraint (11), one of the following two cases must hold.
• Case 1: there exists J ⊆ [n] such that I ∩ J 6= ∅ and y+J > 0
• Case 2: zi > 0 for all i ∈ I.
In the first case, let y′ be a new vector obtained from y by changing
the following four coordinates and leave others the same
(y′)+J−I = y
+
J−I + 1, (y
′)−I−J = y
−
I−J + 1(y
′)+J = y
+
J − 1, (y′)−I = y−I − 1.
Since (z, y) is feasible, a short computation shows that (z, y′) is also
feasible. Since (g, f) is a crossing family,
F (z, y)− F (z, y′) = f(J)− g(I)− (f(J − I)− g(I − J)) ≥ 0.
Since (z, y) is optimal, (z, y′) is another optimal solution. Repeating
this argument on (z, y′) until we obtain an optimal solution (z, y) where
the support of the positive coordinates of y+ and y− are disjoint. That
is, if y−I > 0 for some I, then we must be in case two. In this case,
since P (g, f) ∩ [0, 1]n 6= ∅,
0 ≤ g(I) ≤ |I|
for all I ⊆ [n]. Let (z′, y′) be obtained from (z, y) by changing the
following coordinates and leave the others fixed
z′i = zi − 1 for all i ∈ I
(y′)−I = y
−
I − 1.
Since (z, y) is feasible, a short computation shows that (z′, y′) is also
feasible. Furthermore,
F (z, y)− F (z′, y′) = |I| − g(I) ≥ 0.
Since (z, y) is optimal, (z′, y′) is also optimal. Repeatedly apply this
argument gives an optimal solution (z, y) with y−I = 0 for all I ⊆ [n].
Therefore, the dual program is equivalent to
min
n∑
i=1
zi +
∑
I⊆[n],I 6=∅
y+I f(I)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
zi · e{i} +
∑
I⊆[n],I 6=∅
y+I eI = eT
zi, y
+
I ∈ N.
By [Sch03, Corollary 46.1b], this is equal to minJ⊆T (f(J)+|T−J |). By
[Sch03, Theorem 49.12], this system is totally dual integral. Therefore,
FINITE MATROID-BASED VALUATION CONJECTURE IS FALSE 25
the values of the primal and dual agree. This establishes (9). Rewriting
this in terms of ρi, we have
ρ(I) = min
J⊆I
(
r∑
i=1
ρi(J) + |I − J |) for all I ⊆ [n].
By [Sch03, Theorem 42.1], this implies E = ⋃ri=1 E i, a contradiction on
the irreducibility of E . This concludes the proof. 
Appendix B. Gross substitutes valuations for n = 3
Figures 5 to 12 accompany the proof of Theorem 2 for n = 3, which
can be found at the end of Section 3. For each figure, the LHS gives a
parametrization of v that is necessary to obtain this regular subdivision,
the caption shows the conditions on the weights, while the RHS writes
this valuation as a maximum bipartite matching. This establishes both
Theorem 2 for the case n = 3 and Corollary 16.
1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w3
Figure 5. 0 ≤ w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1.
1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w2 − a
w3
Figure 6. 0 < w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1, a < w2
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1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w 3
b
a
Figure 7. 0 ≤ a < w3, 0 ≤ b < w2, w3 − a 6= w2 − b,
w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1.
1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w 3
w2 − c
w3 − c
Figure 8. 0 < c ≤ w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1.
1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w 3
w2
w3
w3 − c
Figure 9. 0 < c ≤ w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1
1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w 3
w2 − b
w3− b
w3 − c
Figure 10. 0 < b < c < w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1
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1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w 3
w2 − b
w
2 − a
w3
Figure 11. 0 < a < b, w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1, b ≤ w2, b− a < w3
1
2
3
A
B
C
w1
w2
w 3
w2 − a
w3− b
w3 − b− c
Figure 12. 0 < a < w2, 0 < b < b+ c < w3, w3 ≤ w2 ≤ w1
